updated 2:55 PM (EST) on 10/24/08
Introductory example: Suppose Jessica bears a widely recognized right to privacy in her home. She is therefore protected from spying by government researchers — regardless of any socially beneficial results their study might generate. Jessica is also protected from spying by unaffiliated strangers — regardless of any voyeuristic pleasure they might derive.
You probably recognize phrases like: women's rights, labor rights, children's rights, disability rights, voting rights, civil rights, and gay rights. The American Bill of Rights, at least in theory, favorably impacts all citizens. Though first devised by and for "wealthy white male landowners", rights are an inherently neutral concept that has extended far beyond the originators [1].
Role Within PhilosophyRights are essential to deontological ethics (from Greek deon = obligation, necessity, or binding). Teleological or consequentialist approaches to ethics, like utilitarianism, are incompatible with rights (from Greek telos = end, result, or goal). Deontology concerns duties and the immediate morality of behavior. Teleology concerns objectives and the consequences of behavior. Utilitarians endorse acts or rules that maximize the general welfare (pleasure, happiness). Rights theorists seek protections that will not bend to consequences — erode simply if others might benefit.
How prominent philosophers, who have challenged our relationship with nonhumans, break along the above lines: Peter Singer (Animal Liberation - 1975) is a utilitarian who only uses the term rights rhetorically [2]. Tom Regan (The Case for Animal Rights - 1983) and Gary Francione (Introduction to Animal Rights - 2000) have embraced deontology and promoted true rights.
Fundamental DefinitionsRights are mechanisms (tools) that help structure our senses of empathy, respect, obligation, and/or privilege. Rights are used to protect interests, which are anything that sentient beings "want, desire, or prefer" [3]. For example, Tommy prefers racquetball to tennis, Yvette wants to eat an apple, and they both desire long happy lives. Things have no interests — they are physically unable to "want, desire, or prefer". Rights can protect any interests held by any sentient beings, or groups thereof. Rights are not directly applicable to things, which have no interests to protect.
Application and OperationRights are indirectly applicable to things. Sentient beings can have interests that concern things. For example, group-K wants to conserve the local freshwater spring. Whoever safeguards this interest with a right is obliged not to spoil the spring. A thing is only protected to satisfy group-K's interest. Things have no subjectivity — no self to appreciate existence. Things cannot be attributed intrinsic value. Their worth is "extrinsic or conditional" — strictly relative to sentient beings [3]. Group-K is not claiming springs bear rights. Polluting the spring violates group-K's right.
Rights, metaphorically speaking, place brick walls around interests. Walls that cannot be demolished simply because it would benefit the trespasser(s), or generate positive consequences generally. For example, Jessica desires physical security. She lives where basic human rights are well established. Society will not tolerate anyone murdering her for food, stealing her organs, or making her undergo invasive medical procedures that might lead toward disease cures. Such transgressions are rejected prima facie, regardless of any potential advantages or favorable outcomes.
Rights must be socially acknowledged. For example, Jessica desires personal liberty. But when 99.9 percent of those around Jessica deny this interest, her freedom is jeopardized and she will probably be enslaved. Conversely, when 99.9 percent of those around Jessica respect her interest in personal liberty, her freedom is safeguarded and her enslavement is rather unlikely.
Rights must be socially fulfilled. Since total compliance with rights is unrealistic, perpetual vigilance is called for. Arrangements must be developed that reasonably guarantee interests will be protected. For example, group-L has long been discriminated against. Establishing their physical security might entail active steps like: challenging stereotypes and language that degrade group-L, punishing those who assault group-L members, and rehabilitating group-L victims of assault.
Rights are not necessarily absolute. For example, Jessica can forfeit her right to liberty. Society will respond if she threatens to set off explosives at her school. There would be cause to break down the walls surrounding her liberty and mandate psychological treatment or imprison her. Furthermore, despite normally complying with basic human rights, William might kill and consume Jessica if they were stranded together at sea and starvation overwhelmed his rationality.
Rights are not always legislated. For example, prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, some Americans were permitted to own human slaves. But conscientious individuals could refuse by embracing the slaves' moral rights. Governments protect citizen and state interests by enacting legal rights, which are enforced by the courts, police, military, and so on. Individuals might disagree with a legal right, yet never transgress the protected interest because they fear state reprisal.
Rights are an ethical construct. Metaphysical objects, like deities and spirituality, are not necessary to formulate rights. Despite popular language use, rights are not something sentient beings actually have (like vestigial organs), but something others must give them (like shields). All sentient beings can receive rights, they are moral patients. But only some sentient beings are moral agents who can comprehend, abide by, and bestow rights. Many humans, including the sociopathic and very young, are granted rights despite their malformed or undeveloped moral agency.
Conclusion and SummarySentient beings have interests because they can "want, desire, or prefer". Rights protect interests non-consequentially (irrespective of consequentialist considerations). Put another way, a right places its interest off-limits, even from those who might gain from disregarding it. Only this kind of barrier can rule out transgressions like rape, slavery, and racial discrimination.
Endnotes
You probably recognize phrases like: women's rights, labor rights, children's rights, disability rights, voting rights, civil rights, and gay rights. The American Bill of Rights, at least in theory, favorably impacts all citizens. Though first devised by and for "wealthy white male landowners", rights are an inherently neutral concept that has extended far beyond the originators [1].
Role Within PhilosophyRights are essential to deontological ethics (from Greek deon = obligation, necessity, or binding). Teleological or consequentialist approaches to ethics, like utilitarianism, are incompatible with rights (from Greek telos = end, result, or goal). Deontology concerns duties and the immediate morality of behavior. Teleology concerns objectives and the consequences of behavior. Utilitarians endorse acts or rules that maximize the general welfare (pleasure, happiness). Rights theorists seek protections that will not bend to consequences — erode simply if others might benefit.
How prominent philosophers, who have challenged our relationship with nonhumans, break along the above lines: Peter Singer (Animal Liberation - 1975) is a utilitarian who only uses the term rights rhetorically [2]. Tom Regan (The Case for Animal Rights - 1983) and Gary Francione (Introduction to Animal Rights - 2000) have embraced deontology and promoted true rights.
Fundamental DefinitionsRights are mechanisms (tools) that help structure our senses of empathy, respect, obligation, and/or privilege. Rights are used to protect interests, which are anything that sentient beings "want, desire, or prefer" [3]. For example, Tommy prefers racquetball to tennis, Yvette wants to eat an apple, and they both desire long happy lives. Things have no interests — they are physically unable to "want, desire, or prefer". Rights can protect any interests held by any sentient beings, or groups thereof. Rights are not directly applicable to things, which have no interests to protect.
Application and OperationRights are indirectly applicable to things. Sentient beings can have interests that concern things. For example, group-K wants to conserve the local freshwater spring. Whoever safeguards this interest with a right is obliged not to spoil the spring. A thing is only protected to satisfy group-K's interest. Things have no subjectivity — no self to appreciate existence. Things cannot be attributed intrinsic value. Their worth is "extrinsic or conditional" — strictly relative to sentient beings [3]. Group-K is not claiming springs bear rights. Polluting the spring violates group-K's right.
Rights, metaphorically speaking, place brick walls around interests. Walls that cannot be demolished simply because it would benefit the trespasser(s), or generate positive consequences generally. For example, Jessica desires physical security. She lives where basic human rights are well established. Society will not tolerate anyone murdering her for food, stealing her organs, or making her undergo invasive medical procedures that might lead toward disease cures. Such transgressions are rejected prima facie, regardless of any potential advantages or favorable outcomes.
Rights must be socially acknowledged. For example, Jessica desires personal liberty. But when 99.9 percent of those around Jessica deny this interest, her freedom is jeopardized and she will probably be enslaved. Conversely, when 99.9 percent of those around Jessica respect her interest in personal liberty, her freedom is safeguarded and her enslavement is rather unlikely.
Rights must be socially fulfilled. Since total compliance with rights is unrealistic, perpetual vigilance is called for. Arrangements must be developed that reasonably guarantee interests will be protected. For example, group-L has long been discriminated against. Establishing their physical security might entail active steps like: challenging stereotypes and language that degrade group-L, punishing those who assault group-L members, and rehabilitating group-L victims of assault.
Rights are not necessarily absolute. For example, Jessica can forfeit her right to liberty. Society will respond if she threatens to set off explosives at her school. There would be cause to break down the walls surrounding her liberty and mandate psychological treatment or imprison her. Furthermore, despite normally complying with basic human rights, William might kill and consume Jessica if they were stranded together at sea and starvation overwhelmed his rationality.
Rights are not always legislated. For example, prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, some Americans were permitted to own human slaves. But conscientious individuals could refuse by embracing the slaves' moral rights. Governments protect citizen and state interests by enacting legal rights, which are enforced by the courts, police, military, and so on. Individuals might disagree with a legal right, yet never transgress the protected interest because they fear state reprisal.
Rights are an ethical construct. Metaphysical objects, like deities and spirituality, are not necessary to formulate rights. Despite popular language use, rights are not something sentient beings actually have (like vestigial organs), but something others must give them (like shields). All sentient beings can receive rights, they are moral patients. But only some sentient beings are moral agents who can comprehend, abide by, and bestow rights. Many humans, including the sociopathic and very young, are granted rights despite their malformed or undeveloped moral agency.
Conclusion and SummarySentient beings have interests because they can "want, desire, or prefer". Rights protect interests non-consequentially (irrespective of consequentialist considerations). Put another way, a right places its interest off-limits, even from those who might gain from disregarding it. Only this kind of barrier can rule out transgressions like rape, slavery, and racial discrimination.
Endnotes
[1] Introduction to Animal Rights by Gary Francione (2000 book) p168
[2] Petitioning PeTA and Who's for Animal Rights? by Roger Yates (2007 essays)
"With the benefit of hindsight, I regret that I did allow the concept of a right to intrude into my work so unnecessarily at this point; it would have avoided misunderstanding if I had not made this concession to popular moral rhetoric." from The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals by Peter Singer (1978 article) p122
[3] Clarifying the Meaning of a “Right” by Gary Francione (2007 essay)
